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CASES NOTED
CONFLICT OF LAWS-FULL FAITH AND CREDIT-ESTABLISH-
MENT OF FOREIGN DECREES AS LOCAL DECREES
A New York court granted a decree of separate maintenance to the
wife. The husband subsequently sued for divorce in Nevada and obtained
a default judgment on substituted service. The wife then brought suit in
Nevada to assert her New York decree. Held, a Nevada court, under the
full faith and credit clause, must recognize the validity of the decree of the
New York court for all payments to the wife, including those accruing after
the Nevada divorce, even though under Nevada law a divorce cuts off all
liability under a pre-existing separate maintenance decree. Summers v.
Summers, 241 P.2d 1097 (Nev. 1952).
The full faith and credit clause,' implemented by an Act of Congress, 2
substituted a command for the earlier principles of comity and thus altered
the sovereign status of the states. Prior to the first \Villiams case,3 it was
not deemed a denial of full faith and credit for a state to refuse to recognize
a decree of divorce granted in a sister state by constructive service of process
on the defendant spouse. 4 However, the second Williams case5 held that it
was not a denial of full faith and credit for a sister state to make separate
inquiry into the matter of jurisdiction of the court granting the divorce.
This right of inquiry was later restricted to cases wherein the defendant
spouse had not made a personal appearance. 6
In Estin v. Estin7 it was held that a New York court was not violating
the full faith and credit clause by enforcing its own separate maintenance
decree issued prior to a divorce decree of a sister state, even though the law
of the sister state was that a final divorce decree terminated all liability
under a prior separate maintenance decree. The court ruled that the state
of the domicile of one spouse may not, through the use of constructive
service, enter a decree that changes every legal incidence of the marriage
relationship. The court left open the question whether the separate main-
1. U. S. CONST., Art. IV, § 1.
2. 1 STAT. 122 (1790), 28 U.S.C. § 687 (1948).
3. Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U.S. 287 (1942) reversed Haddock v. Haddock,
infra n. 4.
4. Haddock v. Haddock, 201 U.S. 562 (1906) (decided that New York courts need
not recognize a divorce granted a husband in Connecticut by substituted service with
respect to a New York wife).
5. Williams v. North Carolina, 325 U.S. 226 (1945).
6. Sherrer v. Sherrer, 334 U.S. 343 (1948).
7. Estin v. Estin, 334 U.S. 541 (1948).
8. Id. at 541, 546.
MIAMI LAW QUARTERLY
tenanee decree would similarly be entitled to full faith and credit in Nevada
courts.9
Some courts hold that a valid foreign decree of absolute divorce, even
though obtained by constructive service, terminates the obligation of the
husband to pay separate maintenance under a local decree previously ren-
dered, as to installments accruing after the foreign divorce decree. 10 This
is based upon the reasoning that separate maintenance cannot be separated
from the marital status, and if that status is validly dissolved, whether by a
foreign or local decree for absolute divorce, the incident of that status neces-
sarily dies with it. Other courts hold that a valid foreign decree of divorce
granted by constructive service does not terminate a local separate mainten-
ance decree." This view is based on the theory that' the marital status is
separable from its incidents, such as the obligation to pay maintenance.
It has been held that a former wife may successfully sue, on diversity
of citizenship, on a judgment granted by a state court for accrued payments
under a separate maintenance decree, where subsequent to the separate
maintenance decree the husband obtained a divorce through the use of sub-
stituted service. 12 The court reasoned that the husband could have appeared
in the proceedings leading to the judgment and pleaded any defenses he
might have had. It is generally conceded by the courts that a decree for
future installments of alimony not yet due is not, as to such installments,
enforceable under the requirements of full faith and credit.' 3 Generally it
has been held under principles of comity, as well as public policy, that a
foreign decree may be established as a local decree by asserting it in the
local court.14 In such a case the husband, since the wife is seeking equitable
relief, may present any defenses which exist in his favor,'5 such as the exist-
ing law of the state that an absolute divorce ends the right to alimony under
the former separate maintenance decree.
In the instant case the plaintiff did not reduce the accrued payments
to judgment in the New York court. Instead, she established the decree of
separate maintenance obtained in New York as a local decree in Nevada.
It is submitted that in so doing the local law of Nevada should have been
applied. Under Nevada law an absolute divorce bars all future obligations
under a separate maintenance decree. It appears that the Nevada court
9. Id. at 549.
10. E.g., Cardinale v. Cardinale, 8 Cal.2d 762, 68 P.2d 351 (1937); State v. Lynch,
42 Del. 95, 28 A.2d 163 (1942); Shaw v. Shaw, 332 11., App. 442, 75 N.E.2d 411(1947); Rosa v. Rosa, 296 Mass. 271, 5 N.E.2d 417 (1936); Rodda v. Rodda, 185 Ore.
140, 200 P.2d 616 (1948).
11. E.g., Estin v. Estin, 334 U.S. 541 (1948); Kreiger v. Kreiger, 334 U. S. 555
(1948); Bennett v. Tomlinson, 206 Iowa 1075, 221 N.W. 837 (1928) Schoen v. Schoen,
181 Misc. 727, 47 N.Y.S.2d 942 (Sup. Ct. 1944).
12. Bassett v. Bassett, 141 F.2d 954 (9th Cir.), cert. denied 323 U.S. 718 (1944).
13. Sackler v. Sackler, 47 So.2d 292, 294 (Fla. 1950).
14. Cousineau v. Cousineau, 155 Ore. 184, 63 P.2d 897 (1936); Biewend v. Bie-
wend, 17 Cal.2d 108, 109 P.2d 701 (1941).
15. Sackler v. Sackler, 47 So.2d 292, 295 (Fla. 1950).
CASES NOTED
confused the conflict-of-laws rules applicable to foreign decrees under the
full faith and credit clause with the law to be applied where foreign decrees
for separate maintenance are established as local decrees. In so doing, it is
submitted that the Nevada court made an unnecessary extension of the doc-
trine laid down in the Estin case. " '
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - PENALTY PROVISIONS UNDER THE
FEDERAL REGULATION OF LOBBYING ACT
The National Association of Manufacturers sought to enjoin prosecu-
tions against them by the Government for violations of the Federal Regula-
tion of Lobbying Act, contending that the penalty provision' infringed
constitutional rights of freedom of speech and petition. Held, the penalty
contravenes the First Amendment of the Constitution guaranteeing freedom
of speech and petition. National Asociation of Manufacturers of the United
States v. McGrath, 103 F. Supp. 510 (D.D.C. 1952).
The Congress seldom deprives a convicted person of either his Civil
or Constitutional rights as the penalty for violation of a statute, preferring to
rely on the formula of fine or imprisonment.2  However, the last twenty
years have evidenced the increased use of punishment designed to regulate
a particular economic or political situation without resort to imprisonment.,3
Because of the singular nature of the problem involved, the Federal Regula-
tion of Lobbying Act depends for its effectiveness on the prohibition from
influencing legislation for three years, those lobbyists convicted for noncom-
pliance. 4 This sanction is a type which deprives a convicted person of a
Constitutional right as the penalty for his crime. The most frequently
expressed grounds for holding a penal provision, unconstitutional as to a
litigant challenging the validity of the legislation, is that the penalty prevents
16. 334 U.S. 541 (1948).
1. 60 STAT. 839, 2 U.S.C. §§ 261-270 (1946). (The penalty clause provides for afine and imprisonment. In addition, it provides that any person so convicted shall be
prohibited from appearing in a Congressional committee and from attempting to influence
diicctly or indirectly, the passage or defeat of any proposed legislation for a period of
three years. 310 [b]).
2. Statutes covering similar problems: Corrupt Practices Act, 43 S'rAr. 1070 (1925),
2 U.S.C. § 241 (1927) and 18 U.S.C. § 208 (1950) (registration provisions identical to
Lobbying Act, but sanction is fine and imprisonment); The Voorhis Act, 54 STAT. 1201(1940), 46 U.S.C. 643(b) (1944) (fine and imprisonment); Foreign Agents Registration
Act, 52 STAT. 631 (1938), as amended, 56 STAT. 248 (1942), 22 U.S.C. § 618 (1952)(fine and imprisonment).
3. 54 STAT. 1141 (1940); 8 U.S.C. § 706 (1942) (deserting naturalized citizen);
Nelson v. Secretary of Agriculture, 133 F.2d 453 (7th Cir. 1943) (suspension); Wright
v. Securities and Exchange Commission, 112 F.2d 89 (2d Cir. 1940) (expulsion); Farm-
ers' Livestock Comm. Co. v. United States, 54 F.2d 375 (E.D. Ill. 1931) (suspension).
4. 47 COL. L. REv. 98, 109 (1947), n. 66. For the actual effectiveness of this
sanction in the Federal and State Lobbying Act see 27 NEB. L. Rrv. 123 (1947).
5. The right of petition is ", . . a simple, primitive, and natural right. As a privilege
it is not even denied in addressing the Deity." I CooLIEY's CONSTITUTIONAL LIMIXTA-
TiO N 738 (5th ed.).
